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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

Moreover, it should be expected that any jurisdiction exercised by New York courts over non-domiciliaries will be reciprocal2
ly exercised by foreign courts over New York domiciliaries.
CPLR 302(a)(3): Held non-applicable if original
injury occurs without the state.
In order to obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary
under CPLR 302(a) (3), defendant must:
(1) regularly do or solicit business in New York, or
(2) engage in a persistent course of conduct within the
State, or derive substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered in New York.
Or, the defendant must:
(1) expect or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in New York, and
(2) derive substantial 2 7 revenue from interstate or international commerce.

Subdivision (a) (3) of the section was added in 1966 after
having been recommended by the Judicial Conference. The Conference made the recommendation after the New York Court of
Appeals, in, Feathers v. McLucas,2 had narrowly construed CPLR
302(a) (2) by requiring the tortious act, as contrasted with the
resulting injury, to be committed within the state. CPLR
302 (a) (2) was therefore unavailable to reach a non-domiciliary,
not doing business or transacting business in New York, who,
through an act or omission
without the state, caused a tortious
29
injury within the state.

In Black v. Oberle Rentals, !nw., 3° a third-party defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of jurisdiction.
The third-party defendant was an Indiana corporation, not authorized to do business in New York, who manufactured parts
used in a trailer unit which jack-knifed in Massachusetts resulting
in consequential damages to the New York plaintiff.
In dismissing the action against the third-party defendant,
the court held that in order to predicate jurisdiction on CPLR
302(a) (3), the original injury had to occur within the state.
20A. Miliner Co. v. Noudar, Ltd., 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 329, 266
N.Y.S.2d 289, 294 (1st Dep't 1966).
27 CPLR 302(a) (3) (i) and (ii).

15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
20 See 1 WEINsTIN, KoRN & MILLER, NEW YoRK CIVIL PRACTICE

2-

f1302.10b (1967).
2055 Misc. 2d 398, 285 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1967).
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Although there is no Court of Appeals decision construing this
issue,3 1 lower court decisions appear to be in accord with the instant
case.

The facts of the case show an injury without the state which,
however, resulted in consequential damages within the state through
loss of earnings, hospital expenses and .the like. In Feathers both
the original injury and the consequential damages occurred within
New York. Since the Conference intended to overrule the result
reached in Feathers,2 it is doubtful that the amendment was meant
to go beyond the facts of that case. In any event, keeping in
mind the narrow approach taken by the Court of Appeals, it is
unlikely that a more far-reaching effect would be recognized.
This conclusion is strengthened by the decision in Platt Corp.
v. Platt,3 where jurisdiction over the defendant was predicated on
CPLR 302(a)(2). Defendant was a director of plaintiff corporation and did not attend meetings or perform any duties in
New York. While the decision was predicated on the absence of
a "tortious act within the state" under 302(a)(2), the Court did
mention that even under the then proposed amendment to Section
302 (302(a)(3)), there would be no jurisdictional predicate. It
would appear then that under 302(a)(3), the Court of Appeals
will require some physical contact with the state and this means
that the original injury must occur within the state itself. Moreover, realizing that every accident results in consequential damages
in the plaintiff's home state, a holding to the contrary would most
probably encounter serious due process questions.
CPLR 308(4): Insurer who disclaims liability is
without standing to object to substituted service.
CPLR 308(4) authorizes a court, upon ex parte motion, to
provide for substituted service where service is "impracticable,"
under CPLR 308(1), (2) and (3). A method thus devised by
a court is subject to the due process requirement that service be
reasonably calculated to give the defendant notice of the pending
suit and an opportunity to be heard.34
3
In Atomic Development & Machine, Corp. v. De Stefano, 5
defendant's (insurance carrier "unequivocally" disclaimed liability
31E.g., Rose v. Sans Souci Hotel, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 1099, 274 N.Y.S.2d
1000 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
32hudicial Conference Report on the Civil Practice Law and Rules, 2
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2780, 2786-90 (1966).

17 N.Y.2d 234, 217 N.E.2d 134, 270 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1966).
34
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), rehearing denied, 312
U.S. 712 (1941).
35 55 Misc. 2d 210, 284 N.Y.S.2d 873 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1967).
33

